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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we are concerned with the relationship between the traditional concept 
of market access in goods sectors and the degree of competition in the service sector.  
In particular, we examine the interaction between trade in goods and the degree of 
competition in the “margin” services that facilitate the interaction between producers 
and exporters in one country and final consumers in another.  This includes domestic 
shipping and logistic services, of course, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors 
and other links in the distribution chain that carries imported goods to the consumer. 
 By exploring these issues, we examine an important but somewhat ignored 
aspect of the trading system.  In the European Union, for example, internal trade in 
motor vehicles has been hampered by an antitrust exemption for the distribution and 
servicing of automobiles.  (See both Flam and Nordstrom 1995, and Lutz, 
forthcoming).  Access to the distribution system was also at the heart of a dispute 
between the United States and Japan involving Kodak and Fuji film (Nanto 1998). 
These issues also lurk behind the retail distribution system and its impact on trade in 
both Switzerland and Japan, and behind the German experience with retailing cartels 
(and the threat of foreign retail entry to established domestic players). With the 
elimination of trade barriers for textile and clothing under the WTO’s Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing in 2005, the market power of buyers like Wal-Mart may also be 
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an important in the transmission of price and quantity changes across global textile 
and clothing markets.   
In general, international trade in goods depends on the domestic trade and 
distribution sector that facilitates this trade.  We focus here on the degree of 
competition in the domestic distribution sectors, and the impact on trade in goods.  
This includes an assessment of linkages between service sector competition and the 
value of negotiated market access concessions.  We proceed in this paper as follows.  
In Section 2 we develop a basic analytical model, involving a domestic distribution 
sector with market power.  We work with this model to examine the impact of 
imperfect competition in services for the pattern of trade in goods.  In Sections 3 and 
4 then examine the impact on gains from trade for both importers and exports.  In 
Section 5 we work with data on competition in distribution and sales in several OECD 
countries, econometrically examining the interaction between import protection, 
competition, and the pattern of trade.  We offer concluding comments in Section 6. 
 
2. BASIC MODEL 
We consider the market for imports of a homogeneous good.  The domestic 
government taxes imports that are supplied by competitive firms.  Our focus is on the 
domestic sale and distribution network.  We assume this sector to be less-than-
perfectly competitive.  Thus we shall be focus on the interactions between three sets 
of agents:  the government, consumers, and the distributors. 
 
Import supply 
The home country imports a good that is supplied by competitive, overseas producers.  
The export supply schedule is imperfectly elastic.  Consequently, the importing 
country has some degree of monopoly power in trade.  It subjects trade in these goods 
to an import tax at rate t.  This creates a wedge between the cif price P and the landed 
(that is, after duties are paid) price PL .  Let the total quantity imported be q.  Then the 
inverse supply function is: 
 
P = S(q)    S'> 0 (1) 
 
while landed prices are: 
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P L = P × T    T = (1+ t ) (2) 
 
Import demand 
Consumer demand for the imported good is assumed to be inversely related to price.  
Let P d  be the final demand price, where the inverse demand curve is: 
 
P d = D(q)    D'< 0 (3) 
 
The intermediation sector 
Interaction between the exporter and the final consumer is assumed to require the 
services of a domestic service sector that facilitates both the movement of imported 
goods inland, and also the wholesale and retail distribution, marketing, and any 
ancillary services required to sell the goods.  These services are supplied by a 
domestic service cartel (Cournot oligopoly) at constant marginal cost. 
The total revenue of a representative firm i in the service sector is: 
 
TRi = D(q) × qi  (4) 
 
where qi is the quantity sold by a representative intermediary firm i.  We further 
assume that there are n identical firms in the market, each having a share W = n-1.  It 
is useful to think of W  as an index of market competitiveness that ranges from a value 
of zero, under perfect competition (n = ¥), to a value of one, when a single firm 
monopolizes distribution (n = 1) or, alternatively, an oligopolistic service sector acts 
as a monopolist through perfect collusion in a cartel.   
 Assuming a constant marginal cost c, firm profit is defined as follows: 
 
p i = D(q) × qi - T × S × (q) + c i( )× qi  (5) 
 
Profit maximization then requires the following condition to hold. 
 
( ) ( ) 0'')()( =×-××--×-=
i
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i
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¶
¶p  (6) 
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If we apply the set of standard Cournot-Nash assumptions, including quantity 
competition and symmetry, and defining supply and demand elasticities as es and ed  
then equation (6) can be rearranged to yield the usual perceived MRi = MCi 
condition: 
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From equation (7), distribution firms have market power on both sides of the 
market.  On the cost side, the price they pay for the imported good depends upon the 
total quantity q and the sensitivity of supply to quantity.  Similarly, on the demand 
side, the price at which they sell to consumers is a function of total quantity brought 
to market.  By restricting their trading, the firms are able to both drive down costs and 
drive up prices, widening the price-cost margin and raising profits.   
Differentiating equation (7) with respect to market power, and assuming that 
elasticities are (locally) constant, we can obtain the response of equilibrium quantities 
to tariffs and market power. 
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What is the interaction between tariffs and market power?  Differentiating equation 
(8) with respect to T yields equation (10): 
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Equations (8)-(10) yield the following properties for the implicit function defining 
equilibrium quantity. 
 
00,   ),( ><W= WW TT QQQTQq  (11) 
 
In the special case of linear demand and supply curves, where S(q) = a + bq and 
D(q) = x - yq  equation (11) can be written explicitly as follows (see the annex). 
 
q =
x - Ta - c
1+ W( )× y + Tb( )
 (12) 
 
From equations (10) and (11), we make the following observations: 
 
Observation 1:  International trade volumes are inversely related to the degree of 
concentration in the domestic trade and distribution sector, or alternatively the degree 
of market power exercised in the domestic sector. (Equation 11) 
 
Observation 2: The negative impact of market power on trade volumes is greatest in a 
zero tariff context, and its marginal impact falls with increased levels of trade.  Hence, 
the largest impact will be observed in zero-tariff countries, free trade areas, and 
customs unions.  (Equation 10) 
 
 
3. TARIFFS AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE 
We focus next on the welfare implications of a range of alternative tariff regimes for 
the importer, and the roles played by competition across this range.  For the importing 
 6
country, the gains from trade include three components.  These are profits, tariff 
revenue, and consumer surplus.   
 Profits are obtained by combining equations  (5) and (11).  Starting from free 
trade as a benchmark, this also allows us to define the impact of a tariff on profit Dp . 
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(13) 
 
(14) 
 
In equation (14), the first term in brackets is second order, relating to the impact of 
tariffs on unit margins.  This will be outweighed by the second term for any 
reasonable set of values, as the second term represents the full value of imports, and 
hence the first-order impact of a tariff increase on costs.  Not surprisingly then, 
increased tariffs lead to a fall in profits.   
 Turning next to consumer surplus, we can derive this by integration of 
equation (3), and on focusing on the region between the final demand price and the 
inverse demand curve.  Starting from free trade as a reference point, we can also then 
define the change in consumer surplus DCS  implied by the introduction of a tariff. 
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(16) 
 
 Finally, tariff revenue is also defined by employing equation (11). 
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(17) 
 
We can now examine the impact of a tariff on welfare, starting with free trade 
as our benchmark. 
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DW = Dp + DCS + DTR
= 12 Q1 - Qo( ) D(Q1) - D Q0( )( )[ ]
+ D(Q1) - S(Q1) - c( )Q1 - D(Q0) - S(Q0) - c( )Q0
 
(18) 
 
The basic welfare calculus depends on the trade-off between net efficiency losses on 
the one hand as represented by the Harberger triangle term in square brackets in 
equation (14), and the terms-of trade gains on the other hand, as represented by 
changes in the spread between consumer price and the world price.  In a competitive 
market, this would be captured as part of tariff revenue.  With imperfect competition, 
this is instead shared between government (as tariffs) and intermediaries (as profits).  
For the welfare calculus, the critical issue remains simply the cumulative terms-of-
trade gain, weighed against efficiency losses in consumption. 
We illustrate the implied welfare mechanics for an importer in Figure 1, based 
on the linear case developed in the appendix. It is straightforward in this case to show 
the tariff that maximizes aggregate welfare when the service industry is competitive, 
as this is the conventional optimal tariff that fully exploits the country’s trade power 
with respect to the exporting nation. As the service sector is making no profits, the 
only distortion in the market, from the home country’s point of view, is its 
unexploited monopoly power in trade.  This is corrected by the imposition of t* as 
shown in the figure.1 
It is when there is an additional distortion in the market, in the form of an 
imperfectly competitive distribution sector, that the welfare implications of trade 
policy become more complicated.  (We assume for illustration that the domestic 
intermediation sector is wholly domestically owned.)  The contours in Figure 1 show 
the various levels of welfare that can be achieved through the choice of tariff for any 
level of service-sector concentration, from competition to monopoly. 
In perfect competition, t* maximizes welfare.  It is evident that the optimal 
tariff declines with increasing concentration in services.  Indeed, the optimal tariff 
when the service sector is a monopoly is a subsidy. The more concentrated the service 
sector, the greater its exercise of its market power and, consequently, the lower the 
trade volume.  A tariff further reduces the volume of trade, whereas a subsidy 
                                                 
1 The underlying algebra for the numerical simulations shown in Figures 1 and 2 is shown in 
the annex.  For the simulations in Figure 1, t* = 1×265, while the value of the optimal subsidy 
under monopoly is 0×8953. 
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increases the level of imports and hence consumption.  Such a subsidy benefits the 
service sector but, as their profits are part of national welfare, a welfare maximizing 
government would be prepared to offer it.2  In the setting under consideration, the 
trade volume, consumer surplus and aggregate domestic welfare are the same 
irrespective of whether the government or the service industry is optimally exploiting 
the country’s monopoly power in trade.  The only difference that arises is in the 
distribution of income between the government and the service sector. 
Continuing with our numeric example, the impact of a tariff on the various 
components of welfare and on aggregate welfare is illustrated in Figure 2, where the 
service industry is now assumed to be a duopoly (s = 0×5).  As would be expected, 
consumer surplus declines monotonically with an increasing tariff, while tariff 
revenue increases to a maximum and then falls.  Consequently, for national welfare, 
there is an interior solution for the optimal tariff, indicated by tZ.  If the service rents 
are excluded (in the case of foreign ownership for example), the optimal tariff is 
greater as indicated by tW.  The government, in exercising its monopoly power in 
trade, has the ability to limit the ability of the service sector to extract rents.  When 
these rents accrue to domestic agents, the government will wish to moderate its use of 
the tariff. 
We summarize the relationship between tariffs, profits, trade, and welfare in 
the following observations: 
 
Observation 3:  The optimum import tariff is a decreasing function of the degree of 
market power exercised in the domestic trade and distribution sectors (Figure 1 and 
equation 18). 
 
Observation 4: The optimum markup for the domestic trade and distribution sectors is 
a decreasing function of the underlying import tariff. (Equation A8). 
 
 
                                                 
2 The government can use other domestic instruments to redistribute income away from the 
service firms. 
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4. MARKET ACCESS AND THE EXPORTER 
Consider the impact of alternative tariff and competition regimes for the exporter.  If 
we are focused on quantity alone, then equations (11) and (12) point to a direct 
negative relationship between tariffs and imperfect competition, on the one hand, and 
export volumes on the other.  In addition, from equation (10), the trade volume effect 
of a tariff reduction depends on the underlying degree of competition in the domestic 
distribution sector.  To some extent, tariff reductions may simply lead to a greater 
exercise of market power by the domestic distribution sector, nullifying expected 
direct benefits from tariff reductions in export markets. 
 A second measure of the benefits of improved market access conditions is 
exporter producer surplus PS.  From equations (1) and (11), this can be found by 
making substitutions and integrating to find the area between the inverse supply curve 
and the export price.  This also allows us to calculate the welfare benefit of improved 
market access as manifested through changes in export quantities from q0  to q1.  
 
PS = S(q0) - S(q)( )
0
q0
ò × dq
DPS = S(q1) - S(q)( )
0
q1
ò × dq - S(q0) - S(q)( )
0
q0
ò
» S(q0) - S(q)( )
q0
q1
ò × dq + S(q1) - S(q0)[ ]× q0
 
(19) 
 
 
(20) 
 
Producer surplus is driven by the perceived export demand curve, which in turn is 
determined by both the underlying tariff and the degree of exercised market power of 
the domestic trade and distribution sector in its export market.  Consider the benefit of 
improved market access through tariff reduction.  From equation (19), this is equal to 
the change in producer surplus as measured by the area between the export supply 
curve and the export price P.  This in turn is a function of the realized change in 
export volumes.  The greater the export effect, the greater the market access gains.  
From equation (11), the impact of a tariff on welfare is therefore a function of the 
degree of market power.  We summarize this section with the following observations. 
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Observation 5: The market access benefits of tariff reductions in export markets are 
inversely related to the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and 
distribution sector in the export market. 
 
Observation 6: The benefits of past market access concessions can be offset by future 
increases in the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and 
distribution sector in the export market. 
 
 
5. EMPIRICS 
We turn next to a short empirical exercise.  This involves estimating reduced form 
gravity equations of bilateral trade flows, based on tariffs, transport costs, and 
country-specific effect variables.  (See Feenstra 2004, Chapter 5, and  Hummels 
1999).  We include measures of distribution sector competition, as a check on our 
theoretical results. 
Our basic data for this exercise are summarized in Table 1.  From the OECD 
(2000), we have estimates of the degree of competition in the road freight and retail 
distribution for some, but not all, OECD members.  This includes an index of barriers 
to entry in the sector, an index of price flexibility, and what can be interpreted as an 
overall or composite index of the degree of competition in the sector.  These estimates 
are a one-off, in that we only have a single set for of indexes for the late 1990s.  For 
trade, we work with bilateral merchandise trade data extracted from the GTAP6.2 
database (GTAP 2004).  These data are for 2001.  They offer the advantage of 
including both a bottom-up concordance from detailed tariff data to aggregate 
bilateral trade flows, and also including estimates of bilateral transport cost margins.  
For the 86 countries and regional groupings, we have matched bilateral imports by the 
OECD countries covered by the OECD indexes on the distribution and freight sectors.  
Finally, we also include data on importer GDP and GDP per capita, from the World 
Bank (2002).  After matching trade data to our competition data, we have 1,847 pairs 
of bilateral trade flows involving OECD imports in 2001. 
Our estimating equation is a reduced-form gravity equation, augmented to 
reflect Observations 1 and 2 and equations (10) and (11).  Since we are working with 
a single year, we impose a price normalization, with fob prices set at unity.  Value 
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flows then map to quantities.  Defining imports by country i from country j as M ij , 
we work with the following equation. 
 
M i, j = a0 + a1 ln(GDPi) + a2 ln(PCIi) + a3 ln(Ti, j )
+a4 ln(Gi, j ) + a5 ln(Index i) + a6 ln(Index i)* ln(Ti, j )
+ a7, jD j + a8NAFTAi, j + a9EEAi, j + ei, j
j
å
 
(21) 
 
The D j  terms are dummy variables assigned to each exporter, to reflect the set of 
exporter-specific variables that remain fixed across importers.  The variables NAFTA 
and EEA are also dummies, capturing joint membership in either the North American 
of European free trade block.  The terms G and T measure bilateral transport costs and 
import tariffs (trade-weighted) as a share of total import value.  We expect the 
coefficients applied to these variables, a3  and a4  to both be negative.  Recall that the 
Index term is meant to capture, at least qualitatively, the effects related to W in the 
discussion above.  From equation (8), we expect a5  to be negative as well, while the 
interaction term a6should be positive, from equation (10). 
 Table 2 presents regression results for equation (21), based on all three version 
of our competition index.  Country fixed-effect coefficients are not shown, though 
they are all generally significant at the .001 level across all regressions.  The first 
point to note is that the competition coefficients both have the expected sign with the 
OLS regressions, and they are also generally significant and the .05 or .01 level.  (In 
applying a one-tailed test given out expectations about sign, the interaction term for 
the first competition index is also significant at the .05 level).  Basically, the results 
suggest that tariffs and reduced competition both have a dampening effect on 
estimated trade flows.  In addition, they interact as the theory developed above 
predicts.   
While the OLS results look promising, on further examination of the error 
structures it becomes clear that the underlying OLS assumptions about the error term 
are simply wrong.  Table 2 also reports the results of two tests for heteroscedasticity.  
The Breusch-Pagan(1979) Chi-squared test statistic (as implemented in STATA) 
leads us to reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity at any conceivably reasonable 
level of significance.  Further examination with Szroeter’s (1978) test statistic (a 
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recent STATA addition) points to a pervasive problem, involving roughly half of the 
right hand side variables.  Most of these relate to the exporter fixed effect variables, 
indicating for example greater variance in the data involving some exporting countries 
than others.  This is not surprising, as we have included relatively small aggregate 
trade flows (all flows over $1million), usually involving a range of developing 
countries.3  In these cases, bilateral trade flows may be a function of 
historical/structural variables unique to a given country pairing.  Given the 
pervasiveness of the problem, there is a not an obvious single adjustment to be made 
to the data.  We therefore resort to robust least squares, involving Huber’s (1981) 
robust regressions as implemented in STATA.  These results are shown in Table 2 as 
well.  The pattern is the same as the OLS results, only with greater significance for 
the first competition index, but overall with the same qualitative pattern of results.  
All relevant coefficients are highly significant, and with the expected sign on the basis 
of equations (8)-(11) above. 
One interesting implication of the relationship indicated by the coefficient a6  
and by equation (10) is that variation in the degree of competition will interact with 
the impact of variations in import tariffs on trade patterns.  Indeed, since some of the 
variable impact of competition will be offset by the adjustment of margins by 
distribution sectors, leaving out the competition measures means that we can expect to 
then underestimate the direct impact of tariffs on trade.  To check this, we have re-run 
our estimation of equation (21), but without the inclusion of the competition 
variables.  The resulting estimate of the direct tariff coefficient a3 is shown in 
Table 3.  Indeed, estimates of the coefficient for the direct effects of tariffs on trade 
flows are reduced by roughly half when we leave out the competition index.  This is 
consistent with a pattern across OECD importing countries where domestic retail 
                                                 
3 The regions are: Australia; New Zealand; Rest of Oceania; China; Hong Kong; Japan; 
Korea; Taiwan; Rest of East Asia; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; 
Vietnam; Rest of Southeast Asia; Bangladesh; India; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia; Canada; 
United States; Mexico; Rest of North America; Colombia; Peru; Venezuela; Rest of Andean 
Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Uruguay; Rest of South America; Central America; Rest of 
Latin America; Rest of the Caribbean; Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; United Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; 
Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Rest of EFTA (basically Norway); Rest of Europe; Albania; 
Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Russian Federation; Rest of Former Soviet Union; 
Turkey; Rest of Middle East; Morocco; Rest of North Africa; Botswana; South Africa; Rest 
of South African Customs Union; Malawi; Mozambique; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe; Rest 
of SADC; Madagascar; Uganda; Rest of Sub Saharan Africa 
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cartels adjust their margins up as import tariffs are adjusted down, leading to a 
consistent underestimation of the direct impact of tariffs on trade (when holding 
distribution margins constant).  If data were available, a suggested line of research 
involves matching movements in domestic retail and transport margins on imports 
with respect to variation in import tariffs.  
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The pattern of trade in goods depends on a number of factors.  Recent work has 
stressed transport costs and its linkages to the geography of production and trade.  We 
take a different slant here. In this paper we examine the interaction between trade in 
goods and the degree of market power exercised by the domestic trade and 
distribution sectors – the margin sectors.  We first develop a theoretical model that 
allows us to highlight interactions between the degree of competition in service 
sectors, and the pattern of trade in goods.  This is followed by an econometric 
exercise involving the import patterns of 21 OECD countries vis-à-vis 86 trading 
partners.   Our theoretical results point to an expected linkage between service sector 
competition and goods trade.  At least in theory, the domestic service sector can serve 
as an effective import barrier.  This is also supported by our econometric results.  
These point to statistically significant linkages between effective market access 
conditions for goods, and the structure of the service sector.  They also point to a 
qualitatively significant effect.  Because of the implied interaction, at least across our 
sample of OECD countries, ignoring structure of the domestic service sector may lead 
to a substantial underestimation of the direct impact of tariffs on trade flows.
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 ANNEX:  EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS WITH LINEAR DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
 
In this annex we develop the linear version of the model used for Figures 1 and 2 and 
equation (9.1) in the text.  Equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) define the export supply 
price P, the landed price PL , and the consumer price P d in terms of tariffs t and supply 
and demand coefficients. 
 
P = a + bq  (A1) 
P L = PT T =1+ t  (A2) 
P d = x - yq (A3) 
 
From equations (A1)-(A3), the profit of an individual firm will depend on total 
equilibrium supply, tariffs, and the demand and supply coefficients. 
 
 
p i = (x - yq)qi - (T(a + bq) + c)qi  (A4) 
  
Applying symmetry, so that the number of firms is n = W-1, Cournot-Nash quantity 
competition yields equilibrium quantity. 
 
q =
x - Ta - c
(1+ W)(y + Tb)
 (A5) 
 
 
Equation (A5) is reported as equation (9.1) in the text.  Working with equation (A5), 
we can derive profit margins m and profits p=mq (by substitution into equation A4), 
consumer surplus (from equation A3), and tariff revenue TR = (T -1)q . 
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TR =
(T -1)(x - Ta - c)
(1+ W)(y + Tb)
CS = 12 y
(x - Ta - c)2
(1+ W)2(y + Tb)2
m = c + W(x - Ta)
(1+ W)
p =
c + W(x - Ta)( )(x - c - Ta)
(1+ W)2(y + Tb)
 
 
(A6) 
 
 
(A7) 
 
(A8) 
 
 
(A9) 
 
Assuming that welfare maximization involves tariff revenue, consumer surplus, and 
(domestic) distribution sector profits, and that the service sector is perfectly 
competitive, the optimal tariff T*can be derived from equations (A6)-(A9). 
 
T* =1+
b(x - a - c)
b(a + x - c) + ay
 (A10) 
 
Alternatively, if the distribution sector is imperfectly competitive, the optimal tariff 
T Z can again be derived from equations (A6)-(A9). 
 
T Z =
(2b - Wy)(x - c) + (1+ W)ay
a y + b(1- W)[ ]+ (1+ W)b(x - c)
 (A11) 
 
Figures 1 and 2 in the text are based on equations (A6)-(A11). 
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tariff, t 
monopoly 
competition 
concentration 
 index, W 
free 
trade 
t* t Z 
 
FIGURE 1 
WELFARE LEVELS, TARIFFS, AND COMPETITION IN THE DISTRIBUTION SECTOR 
 
Note:  Figure correspond to the linear supply and demand curves example developed 
in the appendix.   
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FIGURE 2 
DECOMPOSITION OF WELFARE IN THE CASE OF DUOPOLY (W=0.5) 
 
Note:  Figure correspond to the linear supply and demand curves example developed 
in the appendix.   
 
tariff, t 
free 
trade 
W=TR+CS 
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TR 
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TABLE 1, DATABASE OVERVIEW (VALUE DATA REPORTED IN LOGS) 
  Mean Median Max Min 
GDP  importer gross domestic 
product in billions of dollars in 
2001 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
5.909 5.625 9.188 3.895 
PCI PPP-based per-capita income, 
dollars, 2001 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
9.989 10.108 10.442 9.017 
Imports Millions of U.S. dollars in 
2001 
Source: UNCTAD 
COMTRADE and GTAPv6.2 
databases. 
5.109 5.310 12.084 -2.168 
Tariffs 
T=1+t 
MFN trade-weighted tariff 
(with adjustments for trade 
preferences where available, as 
reflected in concordance of 
WTO, UNCTAD, and 
MACMAPS tariff data 
Source: GTAPv6.2 database 
1.054 1.028 2.324 1.000 
Transport 
G =1+ g  
ad valorem estimates of 
bilateral transport costs for 
traded goods,  
all modes weighted by trade 
Source: GTAPv6.2 database 
1.032 1.022 1.230 1.005 
Index 1 Overall index of competition in 
the retail/distribution sector 
Source: OECD (2000) 
2.39 2.45 4.70 0.80 
Index 2 Index of barriers to entry in the 
retail/distribution sector 
Source: OECD (2000) 
2.52 2.30 5.50 0.70 
Index 3 Index of price flexibility in the 
retail/distribution sector 
Source: OECD (2000) 
1.80 
 
2.10 4.00 0.10 
Note:  The scale of competition indexes range from 0-6, for least to most restrictive 
regimes.  For countries reported as an interval by the OECD, the mid-point has been 
used.  Countries for which index data are available are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom.  Trade data are grouped by these 21 importers and by 86 exporting 
countries and regional groupings.  Applied tariff data and transport costs data have 
been matched to these bilateral trade pairs. 
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TABLE 2, OLS AND ROBUST REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF GRAVITY EQUATION OF TRADE 
MODEL 1 
GENERAL INDEX 
MODEL 2 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
INDEX 
MODEL 3 
PRICE COMPETITION 
INDEX 
 OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST 
ln(GDP) 
0.951   
(39.61)*** 
0.958  
(43.69)*** 
0.945   
(39.84)*** 
0.951 
(43.94)*** 
0.924 
(39.77)*** 
0.920 
(42.62)*** 
ln(pci) 
-0.043   
-(0.55) 
-0.006 
-(0.08) 
-0.075 
-(0.92) 
-0.060 
-(0.80) 
0.019  
(0.23) 
0.082 
(1.06) 
ln(T)=ln(1+t) 
-193.721    
-(3.74)*** 
-172.033 
-(3.63)*** 
-194.648 
-(4.58)*** 
-169.312    
-(4.37)*** 
-119.416 
-(4.07)*** 
-78.114 
-(2.87)** 
Trans=ln(1+g) 
 
9.981   
(8.06)*** 
9.880 
(8.73)*** 
9.966 
(8.05)*** 
9.592 
(8.49)*** 
9.801  
(7.90)*** 
9.872 
(8.56)*** 
Competition 
Index=ln(W) 
-1.182 
-(2.21)** 
-1.649 
-(3.37)*** 
-1.120 
-(2.85)*** 
-1.497 
-(4.18)*** 
-0.500 
-(2.20)** 
-0.650 
-(3.08)** 
Interaction of T 
and ln(W) 
 
95.407 
(1.87)* 
131.350 
(2.82)*** 
94.137 
(2.53)*** 
122.021 
(3.60)*** 
47.384 
(2.17)** 
60.971 
(3.01)** 
 
Dummy for 
European 
Economic Area 
 
2.228 
(19.94)*** 
2.221  
(21.76)*** 
2.199 
(19.85)*** 
2.180 
(21.56)*** 
2.170 
(19.61)*** 
2.136 
(20.76)*** 
Dummy for 
NAFTA trade 
 
2.025  
(3.72)*** 
2.017  
(4.05)*** 
2.084 
(3.83)*** 
2.098 
(4.23)*** 
2.165 
(3.97)*** 
2.214 
(4.37)*** 
 
variables 95 95 95 95 95 95 
observations 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847 
df 1751 1751 1751 1751 1751 1751 
F, Pr>F 97.7,   0.0 124.3,    0.0 97.8,    0.0 124.3,    0.0 97.0,    0.0 121.4, 0 
R-squared 0.8413  0.8414  0.8317  
Breusch-Pagan 
test statistic for 
hetero-
skedasticity, 
Pr>Chi2 281.0,   0.00  278.0,   0.00  261.8,   0.00  
Significant hetero-
skedasticity by 
Szroeter's test, .05 
level 
40 of 95 
variables  
41 of 95 
variables  
41 of 95 
variables  
Note: Robust regressions are estimating using Huber method as implemented in STATA, with 
default convergence criteria. t- statistics are reported in parentheses, with *, **, and *** 
indicating .10, .05, and .01 levels of significance for a two-tailed test (or .05, .025, and .005 
where a one-tailed test might instead be appropriate, as discussed in the text).  
Heteroskadasticity tests are based on STATA implementation of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test statistic and Szroeter’s test statistic. 
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TABLE 3, ESTIMATED TARIFF COEFFICIENT WITH AND WITHOUT INCLUSION  
OF COMPETITION INDEXES 
 OLS 
ESTIMATES 
ROBUST 
ESTIMATES 
 
Model 1 
 
 
-193.721    
-(3.74)*** 
 
-172.033 
-(3.63)*** 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
-194.648 
-(4.58)*** 
 
-169.312    
-(4.37)*** 
 
 
 
Model 3 
-119.416 
-(4.07)*** 
 
 
-78.114 
-(2.87)** 
 
 
Model without distribution 
sector variables 
 
 
-83.489 
-(2.77)*** 
 
 
 
-32.420 
-(1.17) 
 
 
 
  
